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The Israeli-Palestinian Impasse: Will 
this Time be Different?
 
‘I
t is past time to stop talking about starting negotiations; 
it is time to move forward.’  Thus announced President 
Barack Obama after his summit meeting with Israel’s 
Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Chairman of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA), Mahmoud Abbas, on the margins of 
the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. Obama 
has joined the ranks of previous US presidents who have urged 
Israel and the Palestinians to resolve their 100 year long conflict, 
to no avail. Developments on the ground, the positions of Israel 
and the Palestinians, and the limited influence of the US make it 
unlikely that the outcome of this most recent attempt will be any different.  
THE SECOND NETANYAHU GOVERNMENT AND THE PEACE PROCESS
Within the Israeli government, there are currently two key decision-makers driving policy 
towards the Palestinians: Defence Minister Ehud Barak and Prime Minister Netanyahu. 
Barak’s power derives not from his role as leader of the Labour party, which holds only 13 
members out of the 74 strong coalition, but rather from his standing in Israel’s security 
establishment and his position as Defence Minister, the Defence Community’s representative 
in the government. In an interview with the Israeli daily Haaretz Barak argued that bilateral 
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians will not yield an agreement, noting that the 
relationship between Israel and the Palestinians is ridden with suspicions, with the impact of 
bloodletting on both sides still very visible. On the other hand, he also emphasized that Israel 
has peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan and that any obstacles to achieving peace with 
other Arab countries will not be insurmountable — especially in the Gulf. Thus, he envisions 
the peace process progressing along two tracks concurrently: small but significant confidence-
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building measures vis-à-vis Arab states, and 
grand regional projects. This two-pronged 
strategy, Barak contends, will create the 
political conditions that could lead to a 
regional peace agreement, which would 
include a settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian 
dispute along the lines of the two-state 
solution. 
The second and more significant decision-
maker is Prime Minister Netanyahu. 
Unlike Barak, who prefers to deal with the 
Palestinians through a regional framework, 
Netanyahu proposes a bottom-up approach 
involving three strands: developing the 
Palestinian economy; supporting the 
Palestinian security forces (as long as they 
are committed to fighting terrorism); and 
unconditionally resuming negotiations. 
Netanyahu has stated that employing such 
a tripartite policy could create the setting 
for achieving peace with the Palestinians. 
However, he conditions this on the 
Palestinians ‘clearly and unambiguously 
recognis[ing] Israel as the state of the 
Jewish people’, and has demanded that the 
territory under future Palestinian control 
will be ‘demilitarized with ironclad security 
provisions for Israel’.   
On the basis of these statements by the 
Israeli Premier and his Defence Minister, it 
would seem that the government is inclined 
at least to explore the possibility of peace 
with the Palestinians through either a 
regional framework or bilateral negotiations.
However, even taking Netanyahu’s and 
Barak’s statements at face value, the peace 
process faces a number of formidable 
obstacles. One is the composition of the 
current Israeli government. Three of the six 
parties comprising Netanyahu’s government, 
and many members of his own Likud 
party, would be absolutely opposed to the 
concessions that would be required for a 
future settlement with the Palestinians. 
Nowhere is this reflected more strongly than 
in Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s 
‘Deal or no deal?’ Benjamin Netanyahu and 
Mahmoud Abbas shake hands in New York. 
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outright rejection of the Annapolis peace 
framework that Israel, the Palestinians and 
most of the international community agreed 
to in November 2007.  Should there even be 
significant progress let alone the prospect of 
a final agreement with the Palestinians, the 
government in its current form would most 
likely collapse.  
The ongoing expansion of Jewish settlements 
in the West Bank and East Jerusalem poses 
another problem for peace. To date, there 
are 289,600 Jewish settlers living in the 
West Bank and some 190,000 Israelis living 
beyond the Green Line in East Jerusalem.  
The network of highways connecting the 
large settlement blocs with the centre of 
Israel is expanding and construction of the 
security wall continues. While threatening 
irreversible changes to the political 
geography of the West Bank, the expansion 
of Jewish settlements is severely jeopardising 
the viability of a future Palestinian state. 
And on this front, the conflict may be 
nearing a point of no return: as long as the 
settlement project continues to expand, 
Israel’s commitment to, and the statements 
of its leaders about, a final peace deal are 
questionable. 
In the past, the Israeli centre-left has been 
vociferous about its opposition to the 
expansion of settlements. This expansion 
was perceived as a major impediment to 
ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through 
either a two-state solution or by a unilateral 
end to Israeli occupation such as the 2005 
withdrawal from Gaza. But since the collapse 
of the Oslo Peace Process and the eruption 
of the Second Intifadah, the 2006 war with 
Hizballah, and the ongoing conflict with 
Hamas, things have changed. This chain 
of events has been interpreted by many 
Israelis as vindicating the longstanding claim 
of right-wing politicians, that rather than 
yielding political gains or peace dividends, 
withdrawals from territories under Israeli 
control would create grave security risks. As 
a result, Israel’s internal political landscape 
shifted significantly to the right, meaning 
that if the Netanyahu government decides 
to expand Jewish settlements it is unlikely to 
encounter significant domestic opposition. 
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THE DIVIDED PALESTINIANS 
The obstacles to peace posed by Israel’s domestic politics are being compounded by a crisis in 
Palestinian politics. President Abbas and his Fatah party have been unable, so far, to challenge 
Hamas—militarily or politically—since the Islamic movement took control of the Gaza Strip 
by force in June 2007. Abbas now presides over only 60 per cent of the Palestinians, with 
the remaining 40 per cent under Hamas control. Abbas and his Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, 
have taken measures to consolidate Fatah’s 
and the PA’s standing in the West Bank. This 
involved an understanding with Israel that 
the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and forces 
loyal to Abbas would destroy any armed 
opposition to the rule of the Palestinian 
leader, including Fatah’s Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigade and Hamas’s Izz al-din al-Qassam. 
Concurrently, under the Dayton initiative, 
the US and the PA developed Palestinian 
security forces loyal to Abbas.  In addition to 
building the PA’s security apparatus, Abbas 
consolidated his political base in Fatah and 
has sought to increase Fatah’s appeal to the Palestinian public. This constituted the backdrop 
for the Sixth Fatah Convention held August 2009 in Ramallah, which unanimously elected 
Abbas as chair of Fatah and voted in a new leadership of Fatah’s Central Committee (FCC).  
The election process was democratic and transparent. The new leadership includes many that 
were imprisoned in Israel (e.g., Jibril Rajoub, Marwan Barghouti, Mohammed Dahlan, Hussein 
al-Sheik) or were Fatah members in Lebanon (Majmoud al-Aloul, Muhammad al-Madani, 
Jamal Muheisen). Hence, the group is perceived as less corrupt and more patriotic than the 
previous FCC leadership. The PA has also managed to improve the economic situation in the 
West Bank: in 2009 economic activity and investor confidence increased and, for the first time 
in years, Palestinian per capita GDP growth is positive.  
Expanding Israeli settlements jeopordise the 
viability of a Palestinian state.
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Notwithstanding these developments the positions of Abbas, Fatah, and the PA are fragile. 
Mirroring the Israeli mood, many Palestinians have become utterly disillusioned by the failed 
peace process. Economic recovery in the West Bank is tenuous as it depends on Israel not 
reinstating the security measures which in the past limited the movements of people and 
trade. Hence, it is uncertain whether the growth in 2009 will become a trend towards 
sustainable economic growth. And political 
and military consolidation is dependent on 
US support and cooperation with Israel. 
Therefore, to many Palestinians the PA’s 
actions look like collusion, designed to 
promote the interests of Palestinian officials 
rather than the Palestinian people. For 
example, when the Gazans were exposed to 
ferocious Israeli attacks during the December 
2008-January 2009 war with Hamas, the PA’s 
silence amid the conflict was thundering. 
Having survived the Israeli onslaught and the ongoing economic blockade imposed by Israel, 
Hamas continues to consolidate its rule over the Gaza Strip, further undermining Abbas’s 
weak position. Hamas refuses to meet the three basic requirements of the Diplomatic Quartet: 
to renounce violence, recognize Israel, and respect previously signed agreements between 
Israel and the PA. Consequently, Hamas has been excluded from the current round of peace 
negotiations. Yet it is worth recalling that Hamas’s sponsored violence in the form of horrific 
suicide bombings during the Oslo Process, was a key factor in the collapse of this initiative. 
Hamas’s ability to inflict damage is even greater now given its enhanced military capability, 
and the political, financial and military support it receives from Iran and Syria. Hence, unless 
the divide in Palestinian politics is resolved in a way that will enable either the PA or the PLO 
to negotiate with Israel on behalf of all Palestinian factions including Hamas, the current 
peace talks are doomed to failure; amid the Palestinian divide Abbas is unable to make any 
significant progress in the peace process, let alone conclude and implement a final agreement. 
Barack Obama’s speech in Cairo belied the 
fact that his approach to the Israel-Palestine 
conflict is similiar to his predecessor.
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THE US FACTOR
In two key respects the Bush and Obama 
administrations are different. Firstly, the 
Bush administration was perceived to be 
heavily tilted towards supporting Israel. 
Obama’s Cairo speech and the ‘engagement’ 
policy towards Iran and Syria, have altered 
this impression. Secondly, the Bush 
administration was always reluctant whilst, 
from the outset, the Obama administration 
has been committed to the peace process. 
Notwithstanding this, the US has so far 
been unsuccessful in advancing the peace 
process with Israel, the Palestinians, and the 
pro Western Arab states. Israel has resisted 
the President’s call to freeze settlements, 
whilst Saudi-Arabia has refused to make 
any confidence-building gestures towards 
Israel. Even the enfeebled Abbas only at the 
eleventh hour accepted President Obama’s 
invitation to join the summit meeting at the 
UN with President Netanyahu. 
There are two reasons why we should not 
be surprised by the lack of US impact. One is 
that, despite the rhetoric, the policies of the 
Obama and Bush administrations towards 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are quite 
similar. Hence, Abbas is expected to deliver 
on the Palestinian side notwithstanding 
the divide in Palestinian politics; Israel is 
not under any significant pressure to halt 
settlement expansion; and the Road Map of 
Peace of 2002 and the Annapolis framework 
of 2007 still constitute the main diplomatic 
reference points. The second is the multiple 
challenges confronting the US, and President 
Obama specifically. From passing the health 
reform bill, through overcoming the financial 
crises beleaguering the global economy, 
to dealing with the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and challenging Iran’s nuclear 
programme, these items are higher on the 
agenda than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Thus, faced with a peace process in tatters, 
it is doubtful whether the US will be able to 
muster the resolve and resources that might 
produce an end to the protracted Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. 
